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JURISDICTION
Ihis Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 78-2-2 (h).
Appellant moves that this Court consider his petition and grant appropriate
relief.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Due Process of law
2. Abuse of discretionary powers
3- Ineffective counsel
*h Cruel and unusual punshment
5. Equal Protection under the law
6. Separation of Powers
7. Cumulative Punishments

I

NATURE OF CASE
The Appellant, HOWARD DALE YOUNG, is an inmate at the UTAH STATE PRISON.
He plead guilty to the offense of Automobile Homicide on Nov 15, 1988 in
the Second Judicial Court in Davis County, JUDGE DOUGLAS L. CORNABI presided.
Case No. 6III. He was sentenced to a 0~5 year sentence. The sentence was
proper and was not appealled.
Appellant having been advised by counsel and informed of the recommendation to the Court by the probation deptment, was led to believe by
both, that a 12-18 month incarceration at the UTAH STATE PRISON would be
the outcome and consequence of his plea,
Appellant met with the UTAH STATE BOARD OP PARDONS on the 3 day of Fteb.
1989 and was required to serve the entire 60 month sentence. No parole date
was given, he was required by said Board to serve his maximum amount of
time, he could be required to serve. Error in Appellants record may have
caused the Boards decision, (or) an abuse of discressionary power caused
such a drastic discision.
Since decisions by the BOARD OF PARDONS are not grievable and all
decisions are final and not subject to review, a petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus was filed in the THIRD JUDICIAL COURT of which had jurisdiction of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Young is a 60 year old man with no criminal history. After
the accident which he caused occured, Mr. Young had feelings of guilt and
felt that incarceration and rehabilitation was just.
His Attorney, Mr. ROBERT VAN SEIVER esq. of Salt Lake City Utah, was
retained to advise and represent him at his court proceedings.
In past years, the offense of Automobile Homicide had been treated by
the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS as a serious offense, but had followed the
guidlelines which they had initiated in November of 1987, unless previous
crimes and criminal history indicated more severe punishment.
When appellant appeared before the BOARD OF PARDONS, they required
him to serve his entire sentence.
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Appellant discovered that his Son's past criminal history had
erroneously been included in his (Appellant's) record.
Verification of same is attached to his petition.
Since the BOARD OF PARDONS decisions are final and not subject to
review, and not grievable through prison channels, this action,
( one of last resort )is presented for review. The petition was denied
by the THIRD DISTRICT COURT.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
In EYITTS

V. UJCEY, 469 us 387, 83 L Ed 2d 821, 105 S CT 830 para

(3c) it states:
The right to appeal would be unique
among state actions if it could be
withdrawn without consideration of
applicable due (469 us 401) process
norms.
And Similarly:
A state has great discretion in
setting policies governing parole
decisions, but it Must nonetheless
make those decisions in accord with
the Due Process Clause,
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 us 471, 481 - 484, 33 L ED 2d 484, 92 S
CT 2593 (I977).
See also GRAHM v. RICHARDSON , 403 us 365 374, 29 L ED 2d 534, 91 S CT
1848 (1971)? BELL v, BURSON, 402 us 535, 539, 29 L ED 2d 90, 91 S CT
1586 (I97I)| SHERBERT v. VERNER, 374 us 398, 404, 10 L ED 2d 965, 83
S CT 1790 (I963)| JOINT ANTI-FACIST REFUGES COMMITTEE v. McGRATH,34l
us 123, I65-I66, 29 L ED 2d 532, 91 S CT 1848 (195) and the Honorable
FRANK FURTER concering. In short:
When a State opts to act in a field
where it's actions has significant
discretionary elements it must
nonetheless act in accord with the
dictates of the Constitition— and,
in particilar, in accord with the Due
Process Clause.
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Since the decisions of the BOARD OF PARDONS are final and not subject
to review; See Utah Code 77-27-5 Due process has been denied. All decision
made by an appointed board must be reviewable.
POINT 2
ABUSE OF DISCRESSONAKf POWER
Because of the duration of time required to serve by the Appellant,
equal to a much greater offense, the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS has
abused their powers granted by the Legislature of the State. The State of
Utah applied for and received Federal Grants (2), to enable the Commission
Of Criminal and Juvenile Justice to proqulmate and follow guidelines
recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Committee, as a result of the U.S.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984-. The new guidelines, as developed by the
caseworker of Appellant Young was 12 months.
To require a 60 year old man with no criminal history to serve (5)
times the guidilines is an abuse of both power and authority, it can be
read no other way.
POINT
INEFFECTIVE

3
COUNSEL

Appellant's Attorney, by failing to substatiate the Criminal record
presented to both the Probation Dept and the Court, and later to the
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS, showed a lack of interest in his client.
To allow his client to plead guilty without a trial, without receiving
consideration ( a lesser charge) was also inappropriate.
Citing WAINWRIGHT v. TORNA, k$$ us 586, 587-588, 71 L ED 2d *±75t
102 S CT 1300 (1982) (per curium):
The Court acknowledges that "(of) course,
the right to effective counsel is dependant on the right to counsel itself"
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POINT *t
GRUEL AND UNUSUAL HJNISHMENT
To require a person 60 yrs. old to serve a (5) year sentence for
an unintentional crime can only be read as both cruel and unusual.
It is equivalent to a federal 2d degree murder charge and possibly
is a life sentence. The perimeters also reflect injustice toward
other constititional protections, (i.e.), equal protection, due process
and cumulative punishment: the intent of the court was over ridden by
an over zealous BOARD OF PARDONS who singled out Appellant Young to
send a message to the Community.
Although Appellate Courts do not disturb a sentence within
statutory limits they may intercede when it raises a constitutional
question. See SOIEM J. HELM, 463 u.s. 277, 303 (1983) it states:
Gross disproportionality between crime and sentence constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Asos
UNITED STATES v. MESSER, 785 F. 2d 832, 83^ (9th Cir. 1986) states:
"appellate review proper when sentence possibly based on false or
inaccurate information in pre-sentence report since due process rights
violated if district court relied on inaccurate information." Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has said that a punishment that does
not comport with the basic concept of human dignity is at the core of
the amendment.
POINT

5

EQUAL PROTECTION
The law permits both the prosecutor and the defendant to appeal
sentences imposed from incorrect application of the guidelines. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that when a statute provides
specific guidelines for placing prisoners in detention, a prisoner has
a protected liberty interest, and that once an interest is classified
as protected, a court must determine what due process protections are
required. The same would hold true for an equal protection issue.
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The guidelines devoloped by the United States Sentencing Committee
to help Judges decide the lenth of sentences imposed are; for less
serious offenses ( a third degree felony) are less than (3) years.
Yet the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS has required Appellant to serve

(5)
In

BOARD OF PARDON v. ALIEN, 107 S CT 2^+15 (l98?) the Supreme Court

held that when "criterias are met" the BOAHD OF PARDONS "shall" release
prisoners. In Appellant Young's case the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS
did not.
All equal protection statutes would clearly indicate justice has
been withheld by the State of Utah. In UNITED STATES v. YOUNG

470 u.s. I

(1985) the court held that identified plain error that seriously affect
fairness, integrity, public reputation or judicial proceedings or which
would result in a miscarriage of justice should be recognised.
Equal protection as related to conditions of confinement are not
in question, however; to require Appeallant to serve more time than
inmates guity of much greater offenses is a violation of his rights.
Numerous inmates in the State of Utah , guilty of Manslaughter both
first and second degree have spent far less time incarcerated than
Appellant. The equal protection violation could not be more clear.
Attached to Appellants original complaint a (5) newspaper clippings
of similar crimes where the defendants all charged with class A Misdemeours and served less than I year incarcerated.
POINT

6

SEPARATION OF PffrfER
The State of Utah, through its BOARD OF PARDONS, violates the
Separation of Powers requirements established by the U.S. Constitution.
All decision made by any appointed group must be reviewable. The
BOARD OF PARDONS is an appointed Board, yet their decisions are not
subject to review. Tills violates the constitution protection provided
in Article I.
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POINT

7

CUMULATIVE RJNISHMENTS
Although the sentencing Judge's expectation of the future coarse
of parole proceedings is not a fundamental defect subject to attack,
in POOR THUNDER v. UNITED STATES, 810 P. 2d 817, 822 (8th Cir 1987)
stated that:
"Violation of need for factual accuracy
in presentencing investigation report is
a fundamental defect."
The pre-sentence report of Appellant was incorrect, it may have
caused probation to be withheld.
In determing or deciding it and when a parole date should be
given, the judgement was taken from the Court. The Parole Board also
was given improper information and a form of Jeopardy was created
in that cumulative punishment was judicated toward Appellant, Here;
extreme punishment was given by the Judge. It was again administered
by the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS.
See CRIST v. BRIBTZ, k37 u.s. 28, 33 (1978), which states:
"Society's interest in protecting the
intigrity of final judgements has also
been articulated a policy justification
for the double jeopardy clause,"
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CONCLUSION
(Relief Sought)
The lower Court did not allow Appellant Young to state his case.
Due process was denied by that Court as it was by the UTAH STATE BOARD
OF PARDONS.
The fact that the UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS have violated his rights
by not following their own guidlines is obvious. In order for Appellant
to receive a fair and just outcome of his plea as explained to him at
the time of his plea; and to insure that this abuse of discressonary
power does not happen to others, and to insure equal treatment under
the law, Appellant Young's guilty plea should be reversed. The Sentence
should be vacated.

RESJECTFULL* submitted this /
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7

day of October, 1989.
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